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CASE COMMENT
Mack et al. v. Attorney General of Canada - Rethinking the

Contemporary Conception of Judicial Discretion and Justice
STEPHANIE TSE*
RtSUMt
La Cour supdrieure de justice et la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario ont rejet6 A 1'6tape
pr6liminaire la r6clamation des plaignants dans l'affaire <<Mack contre le Procureur
g6n6ral du Canada >, au motif que les plaidoiries ne r6v6laient aucune cause
raisonnable de poursuite. Le cas impliquait l'imp6t controvers6 de capitation
personnel, pr6lev6 aupr~s des personnes d'origine chinoise au Canada, entre 1885 et
1923, et une s~rie de r~gles d'exclusion en vigueur de 1923 A1947. Dans le traitement
de ces probl~mes, les deux tribunaux ont favoris6 l'approche juridique traditionnelle
selon laquelle la d6f6rence judiciaire h la 16gislature et la r~gle de droit immuable sont
les 616ments cl6s. L'article sugg~re qu'une telle approche s'avre inad6quate pour
aborder les sujets enjeu, c'est-A-dire l'attitude soci6tale changeante envers le racisme,
l'6galit6, le respect pour la dignit6 humaine et l'obligation de rendre compte de faits
ant6rieurs par l'ttat. On a rejet6, malgr6 sa pertinence, l'argumentation des plaignants
A l'6gard des questions en litige. Ceux-ci pressent les tribunaux de prendre en
consid6ration le mouvement en faveur du recours qui pr6vaut dans d'autres pays aux
prises avec des probl~mes semblables. L'auteure sugg~re que ce manque
d'intervention judiciaire t l'6gard de la prestation des recours appropri6s contre le
racisme d'ttat va Al'encontre des conceptions contemporaines de racisme et d'6galit6
qui pr6valent dans la communaut6 internationale. La conclusion de ces remarques
d6montre qu'6tant donn6 le raisonnement des tribunaux, le Canada se fera bient6t
damer le pion par d'autres nations dans le domaine de la promotion des droits de
1'homme.
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The Ontario Court of Appeal (OCA), in its decision in Mack v. Attorney General of
Canada,l affirmed the decision of the motion judge of the Superior Court of Justice
to strike out the plaintiffs' claim on the grounds that the pleadings disclosed no
reasonable cause of action. 2 The case involved the controversial head tax, levied on
persons of Chinese origin in Canada from 1885 to 1923 and a series of exclusionary
statutes in force from 1923 to 1947 which barred all but a select few Chinese people
from immigrating to Canada.3 Together, these measures represent 62 years of
legislated racism directed solely against the Chinese-Canadian community at the time
when violation of minority rights, according to the lower court and the OCA, could
not be redressed based on the contemporary legal standards. Despite that the case
raised complex issues involving the constitutionality of the historic head tax laws,
customary international law principles prohibiting racial discrimination and unjust
enrichment, the plaintiffs' case was dismissed at a preliminary interlocutory stage
based on the insufficiency of the pleadings filed. Although the OCA and the lower
court were sympathetic with the plaintiffs' case, the courts clearly were not prepared
to assume a pro-active approach to confronting the deficiency of our existing legal
framework in redressing issues such as legislated racism. Nor were the courts prepared
to articulate any useful principles on the legal recourse against state racism that are
consistent with the modern thinking of equality. Not surprisingly, the courts favoured
the traditional legalistic approach whereby judicial deference to the legislature and
the application of black letter law are key. It is questionable whether such an approach
is in fact appropriate or adequate in tackling issues such as the societal attitude towards
racism, equality, respect for human dignity and, the state's accountability for past acts.
All of these matters are constantly evolving and are key elements in the transformation
of Canada into a fairer and better society. It is submitted that our judiciary, as a
functional branch responsible for applying and interpreting the enactments of
government must give due regard to the contemporary conception of these values in
discharging its functions. In fact, as argued below, the refusal by the judiciary to give
consideration to the redress movement prevailing in other countries in similar
disputes, as advocated by the plaintiffs' counsel, has raised doubts about how quickly
Canada as a democratic society is evolving. This lack of judicial intervention with
respect to the remedying of state racism runs contrary to the contemporary conceptions
of racism and equality prevailing in the international community.
On reading the decisions of both courts, it seems that their conclusions are based on
the sound application of the strict principles of the law. Nevertheless, one needs to go
beyond the courts' decisions to peruse the affidavits and memoranda of arguments
1.

2.
3.

(2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 737, 217 D.L.R (40") 583. A request for leave to appeal the Ontario Court of
Appeal's decision to the Supreme Court of Canada was filed in mid November, 2002. The Supreme
Court of Canada refused to grant leave in March 2003 at (2002] S.C.C.A. No. 476 (S.C.C.)(QL).
Rules of Civil Procedure,R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 21.01(1)(b).
The plaintiffs were mostly the Chinese-Canadian descendants of those subject to the regime in
question and they sought the return with interest of moneys paid as head tax, damages for pain and
suffering, injury to dignity and loss of opportunity stemming from the impugned legislation and other
relief.
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filed by the parties in support of the plaintiffs' application for leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada in order to have a full appreciation of the implications of
the decisions and the attitude of the courts towards the issues. This paper will address
these matters in light of the arguments submitted by the parties. The implications of
the decisions will also be discussed.
THE FACTS
Pursuant to a series of Chinese Immigration Acts passed between 1885 and 1923,
Parliament required persons of Chinese origin to pay a duty or head tax upon entering
Canada. 4 The tax, which increased progressively from $50 in 1885 to $500 in 1903,
was meant to be prohibitive and effectively placed entry into Canada beyond the reach
of many people. Based on the materials filed by the plaintiffs in support of the appeal
to the Supreme Court of Canada, 5 the imposition of the head tax was largely a product
of anti-Chinese sentiment that arose following the first large-scale Chinese
immigration to Canada during the gold rush and later during the construction of the
Canadian Pacific Railway. Prior to 1885, the government of British Columbia had
attempted to impose discriminatory provincial laws on Chinese immigrants with
limited success and had put pressure on the Dominion government to restrict Chinese
immigration. The federal government resisted due to concerns that restricting Chinese
immigration could result in a labour shortage jeopardizing the completion of the
Canadian Pacific Railway. The passage of the first Chinese ImmigrationAct (Act)6 in
7
1885 came shortly after the completion of the railroad.
The purpose of the Act was not to raise revenue, but to discourage specifically Chinese
immigration. Thus, when the number of Chinese immigrants did not decrease to an
expected level following the imposition of the $50 tax, the amount of the head tax was
raised in 1900 to $100 and in 1903 to $500.8 The head tax was abolished in 1923 and
replaced by legislation which for the next 24 years, until its repeal in 1947 after the
Second World War, effectively barred all but a select few Chinese people from
immigrating to Canada. 9 The repeal of the Act in 1947 did not remove all anti-Chinese
aspects of Canadian immigration law. Potential Chinese immigrants were still subject
to Order-in-Council P.C. 2115, which restricted Chinese immigration to a citizen's
wife and unmarried children under the age of 18. Accordingly, between 1947 and 1962,

4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Supra note 1 at 737. The Chinese ImmigrationAct, 1885, S.C. 1885, c. 71.
For the purpose of this case comment, the plaintiffs' materials filed include the Memorandum of
Argument of the Applicant for Leave to Appeal dated November 15, 2002 (Applicant Memorandum)
and Affidavit of Peter Li, sworn October 9, 2002 (Li Affidavit), Affidavit of Constance Backhouse,
sworn November 3, 2002 and Affidavit of David Dyzenhaus, sworn November 15, 2002 and
Affidavit of Jonathan Strug, sworn November 14, 2002 (Strug Affidavit).
Supra note 5.
Applicant Memorandum at para. 2 and Li Affidavit at paras. 5-16.
Ibid. at para. 3 and paras. 19-20 respectively.
The Chinese Immigration Act, 1923, S.C. 1923, c. 38, repealed by the Immigration Act, S.C. 1947,
c. 19.
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grown children, aged parents, siblings, nieces and nephews of Chinese Canadians
continued to be excluded from entering Canada. 10
The state-supported racism, which specifically targeted Chinese people through the
various forms of the Act and other discriminatory measures, has had a devastating
impact on those directly subject to the regime and on the Chinese Canadian community
in general. This profound impact, as submitted by the Plaintiffs, continues to this
day. I I First, the stereotypical view that Chinese people were an inferior race was
officially and legally reinforced. In fact, if one has had the opportunity to read the
debates of the House of Commons prior to and during the enforcement of the Act, they
were fraught with stereotypical attacks specifically leveled at the Chinese. 12 For
example, in 1882, Prime Minister John A. Macdonald, who is still commemorated on
today's Canadian $10 bills, stated that " it is a matter of so great importance that it
will engage our attention, and that of every public man in this House, to discover how
we can admit Chinese labour without introducing a permanent evil to the country by
allowing to come into it, in some respects, an inferior race, and at all events, a foreign
and alien race". 13 This prevailing negative sentiment at the time created a social stigma
applicable to the Chinese as lower-class beings and unwelcome workers. 14 Second,
the single most devastating consequence of the various forms of the Act was the
separation of families and the resulting impediment to the growth of the Chinese
Canadian community generally. Due to the exclusions by the Canadian government,
the Chinese Canadian family as an intact unit did not exist, except in very limited
cases, prior to the repeal of the Act in 1947. Most of the Chinese immigrants who came
to Canada between 1885 and 1923 were adult men who came to find work. Due to the
onerous amount of the tax itself, finding additional funds necessary to pay the head
tax for wives and children was virtually impossible. In any event, the outright
exclusion of Chinese immigration during 1923 to 1947 made it legally impossible for
wives or children in China to join their husbands in Canada. 15 This prolonged
separation of families often meant that most Chinese males living in Canada lived as
married bachelors. Many died while working at constructing the railway in Canada

10. Supra note 8 at para. 3 and paras. 19, 20 and 38 respectively. In fact, during the period from 1885 to
1947, various other anti-Chinese measures were in place which included a denial of the right to vote,
barriers for Chinese immigrants to become citizens, the requirement that Chinese immigrants obtain
certificates of registration upon entering Canada, subject to a fine or imprisonment if failing to do so,
and the placing of a limit on how long a Chinese immigrant could be away from Canada and still be
allowed to return without being subject to the head tax for a second time in order to gain re-entry into
Canada (between 1885 and 1923) or being excluded outright from re-entry (between 1923 and 1947).
See Li Affidavit, at paras. 17, 20 and 21 and Applicant Memorandum at para. 4.
11. Applicant Memorandum at para. 5.
12. House of Commons Debates (12 May 1882) at 1471-1477 (Mr. DeCosmos and Sir John A.
Macdonald) and Report of the Select Committee on Chinese Labour and Immigration (Ottawa, Ont.:
Journal of the House of Commons, 1879) at Appendix 4.
13.

See House of Commons Debates(12 May 1882) at 1477 (Sir John A. Macdonald).

14. Li Affidavit at para. 26.
15.

Applicant Memorandum at para. 7 and Li Affidavit at paras. 28-31.
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without ever being reunited with their wives and children. This resulted in a gender
imbalance in the Chinese Canadian community which did not begin to approach
equilibrium until 1981, thus causing a significant delay in the creation of a second
16
generation of Chinese Canadians.
The harm suffered by Chinese Canadians as a result of the Act was understandably
compounded by the insult arising from the repeated refusal of the Canadian
government to discuss the issue of redress with those seeking relief. This particular
redress movement began in the 1980s when many individuals sought a political
solution to the issue. They worked in coordination with other groups of redress
seekers, including Japanese Canadians seeking compensation for the harms suffered
as a result of anti-Japanese measures, such as internment, that were implemented by
the Canadian government during the Second World War. In 1988, the Canadian
government signed the Japanese Canadian Redress Order, providing reparations to
Japanese Canadians who had been interned and apologizing to the Japanese Canadian
community for the discrimination visited upon it by the government. 17 As for the
redress to head tax payers, Sheila Finestone, then Secretary of State, Multiculturalism
and the Status of Women, made a statement in the House of Commons in 1994 to the
effect that the Canadian government would not accommodate such requests:
In the past, Canada enforced some immigration practices that were at odds with our
shared commitment to human justice. Canadians wish those episodes had never
happened. We wish those practices had never occurred. We wish we could re-write
history. We wish we could relive the past. We cannot. We can and must learn from
the past. We must assure that future generations do not repeat the errors of the
past.... The issue is whether the best way to this [heal the wounds] is to attempt to
address the past or invest in the future. We believe our only choice lies in using
limited government resources to create a more equitable society and a better future
for generations to come. 18
THE LEGAL ISSUES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Given the Canadian government's refusal to resolve this matter, the plaintiffs brought
an action claiming the following: (1) that the Act violated their equality rights under
s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter); (2) that the
legislation was at all times invalid and, therefore, of no force or effect, because it
contravened a customary international law, by which Canada was legally bound,
prohibiting racial discrimination; and (3) that the equitable principle of unjust
enrichment (requiring proof of unjust enrichment, corresponding deprivation and the
lack of juristic justification for such enrichment) required the Canadian government
to disgorge the revenues raised under the head tax legislation. The Attorney General
16. Applicant Memorandum at para. 9 and Li Affidavit at paras. 30-33, 40. It was stated that as late as
1991, 73% of Chinese people living in Canada were not born in Canada.
17. Applicant Memorandum at paras. 10-12.
18. House of Commons Debates, 1505 (14 December 1994) at 9065-66 (Hon. Sheila Finestone). See also
Applicant Memorandum at para. 12.
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1 9 to have the
of Canada moved under rule 20.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure
claim struck out on the grounds that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The claim was rejected at the lower court on the grounds that: (1) it involved an
impermissible retroactive application of the Charter and international instruments;
(2) international human rights law during the period of the Acts' application did not
create a legal prohibition against the type of discrimination imposed by the Act; and
(3) the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment argument could not succeed because the Act, as
a validly enacted statute, necessarily provided a juristic justification for the
enrichment of the Canadian government and the corresponding deprivation of the head
tax payers.
The OCA, in hearing an appeal to have the claim reinstated, stated that the Act was
"one of the more notable stains on our minority rights tapestry."2 0 With respect to the
customary international law issue, the OCA agreed with the lower court's reasoning
and, further found that, in any event, the explicit decision of the Canadian government
to enact the discriminatory legislation had the effect of overriding any international
law prohibition against it.21
With respect to the equality right issue under s. 15 of the Charter, the plaintiffs
advanced three arguments. First, the legislation stigmatized people of Chinese origin
because it deemed them to be less worthy than other people and that such stigma, it
was argued, continues unabated to date as the government is unwilling to provide
redress for the harm occasioned by the impugned legislation. The OCA rejected this
argument finding that the Charter claim in this regard was retroactive (i.e., that
contemporary ethics cannot be applied to historic racism).
Second, the plaintiffs relied on the 1988 post-Charter agreement between the
government of Canada and Japanese Canadians in which the government had provided
redress for violating the human rights of Japanese Canadians during the Second World
War. The plaintiffs argued that the government's failure to provide the Chinese
Canadian community with similar redress was discriminatory because it promoted and
perpetuated the idea that Chinese Canadians were less worthy of recognition and less
valuable to society than the Japanese Canadians. The OCA dismissed this argument
on the grounds that the groups were not sufficiently similar to give rise to a s. 15 claim
and that sufficient factual details 22 had not been pleaded in the statement of claim in
19. Supra note 2.
20. Supra note 1 at 740.
21.

Supra note 1 at 750.

22. Supra note I at 745. The OCA stated that the Plaintiffs should have included in their statement of
claim "facts as to a discrimination claim framed in the post-Charterperiod" and that the pleadings
failed to allege facts capable of showing discrimination, namely, facts capable of showing that the
Redress Agreement utilized the device of stereotype or that the exclusion of the appellants from said
Agreement had the effect of demeaning their worth and dignity. See also supra note 1 at 744 and note
4. The JapaneseCanadian Redress Agreement, P.C. 1988-9/2552, dated October 31, 1998, stemmed
from a policy decision on the part of the government of the day, under the leadership of the Rt. Hon.
Brian Mulroney, to provide redress for government actions, including internment or relocation within
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support of this argument. The OCA refused to grant the Plaintiffs leave to amend their
statement of claim, despite the fact that they had submitted before the OCA a draft
23
amended claim setting out the factual details regarding the similarity of the groups.
The OCA further reasoned that the fact that the government gives redress to one group
of Canadians in respect of their claim of discrimination through a voluntary agreement
does not in itself provide a legal basis for identical redress to be given to another,
unrelated group, in respect of their separate claim of discrimination.
Third, the Plaintiffs argued that the current international law norms supporting redress
for past incidents of discrimination by governments could give rise to an independent
right of redress under s. 15 of the Charter.The Plaintiffs drew interesting examples
from decisions of German, British and other foreign courts to illustrate the prevailing
recognition in the international community of the need to confront past incidents of
officially sanctioned racism and to provide legal recourse. By contrast, however,
Canadian courts have been silent in this regard. The OCA does not appear to have
addressed this third Charterargument advanced by the Plaintiffs' counsel. Instead, in
a six-line paragraph, it briefly stated that the foreign decisions cited were viewed as
examples of foreign domestic law, not customary international law and thus not
binding on Canada. 24 Effectively, the OCA avoided expressing any judicial view
regarding the increasing recognition of historical wrongs and the availability of legal
redress against past racism in the larger international community.
Regarding the issue of unjust enrichment, the OCA dismissed the appeal finding that
the Plaintiffs' arguments in support of a lack of juristic justification as a criterion to
succeed on this issue were based either on the Charter or international law. Since
arguments on the Charteror international law failed, the Plaintiffs' arguments on the
lack ofjuristic justification also were deemed to be invalid. The OCA did not address
in its reasoning the Plaintiffs' arguments that in determining whether a discriminatory
law provides a juristic reason, it is appropriate to consider how representative the
legislature was at the time of the enactment. 25 The Plaintiffs argued that since the
Parliament in question was unrepresentative, the principle of judicial deference to
legislative decision-making therefore should not apply. They cited foreign decisions
that addressed how a contemporary court should deal with the application of an
extremely unjust, racist but validly enacted law, such as Nazi Decree 11 which stripped
German Jewish emigres of their citizenship and proprietary rights. In these cases, the
German courts and the House of Lords2 6 had refused to defer absolutely to the

Canada, expulsion or deportation from Canada and deprivation of property, taken against certain
Japanese Canadians during the Second World War under the National Emergency Transitional
Powers Act, 1945, S.C. 1945, c. 25 and other transitional legislation.
23. Applicant Memorandum at paras. 83-86.
24. Supra note I at 749.
25. Applicant Memorandum at paras. 25 and 26.
26. Applicant Memorandum at para. 48, see Oppenheimer v. Cattermole, [1976] A.C. 249 at 278 (H.L.)
per Lord Cross of Chelsea where it was stated that "to my mind a law (German citizenship law
revoking the citizenship of Jews) of this sort constitutes so grave an infringement of human rights that
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existence of positive law. The Plaintiffs further relied on several British Columbia
cases from the 1800s, 2 7 at the time when the Act had been in force, in which the courts
had refused to uphold racist provincial laws. Despite all of these important arguments
and judicial decisions, the OCA, in a sweeping sentence found in a footnote at the end
of its decision, stated that it was not concerned with "facially valid laws enacted by a
totalitarian or other despotic regime."'28
IMPLICATIONS OF THE JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Many questions deserve our attention. The way ourjudiciary has disposed of the issues
raised in the Mack case is indicative of the contemporary judicial (and likely the
ultimate societal) thinking towards the meaning of and practices concerning equality
and racism in Canada. In a culturally diverse society such as ours, social solidarity is
possible only if people's rights to equality and human dignity are guaranteed and
respected. The mere assertion and reiteration by the government or the courts that
Canada values and respects these notions are not enough. In fact, this guarantee of
human rights and equality has no significance if people are not secure in the knowledge
that they are all recognized at law as human beings equally deserving of concern and
respect. The recognition that Canada violated the rights of the Chinese people and
other ethnic groups in the past is an important first step but it should never be the end
to the issue. Since the societal attitude towards racism and respect for equality has a
large cognitive component to it, it is the way of thinking of the general public that
must be properly guided and shaped. We recognize that the societal awareness of the
significance of racial equality and respect for human dignity does not always mature
naturally and that the evolution of this societal awareness is often an on-going process.
With the introduction of the Charter,the Canadian government and the Supreme Court
of Canada have shown an open attitude towards defining what the contemporary
conception of equality and human rights should be. Beverly McLachlin C.J.C.
previously remarked as follows: "the first and arguably primary goal of modern
equality law is to improve the situation of people belonging to groups that have
traditionally suffered discrimination, '29 "the ethos of ameliorative equality dominates
recent thinking, Supreme Court of Canada decisions repeatedly assert that reversing
the harmful effects of stereotypical discrimination is the central purpose of section
15," ' 30 and "the state is obliged to promote the achievement of such equality by

the courts of this country ought to refuse to recognize it as a law at all."
27. Such as R v. Gold Commissioner of Victoria District(1886), 1 B.C.R. Pt II 260 at 262 (Div. Ct.) (per
McCreight.), in which it was held that " a tax was imposed falling unequally upon particular
individuals in a class, and Chinese miners could not be singled out from a class of miners generally
and be subjected to burden over and above those borne by others of the same class, such imposition
being a lawless extraction not within the province of free governments."
28. Supra note I at 755.
29. Beverly McLachlin C.J.C., "Equality: The Most Difficult Right" (2001) 14 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 1 at 24.
30. Ibid. at 25.
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legislative and other measures to protect and advance persons, or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination which envisages remedial equality". 3 1
The courts in handling the Mack case, however, did not move forward in the direction
consistent with the stated purposes of s. 15. While recognizing the deplorable human
rights history Canada has maintained vis-a-vis the Chinese in the past and the
contemporary acknowledgement of the need to uphold equality, both courts proceeded
to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims based largely on a technical reading of the black letter
law. What about the ideals of upholding the ethos of ameliorative equality that
dominates recent thinking and remedial equality? None of these ideals was mentioned
or seemed to have played any part in the courts' decisions in the Mack case. It is simply
unconvincing for the courts to express their sympathy towards the Plaintiffs' cause
while at the same time, ignoring the significance of the amelioration of the conditions
of the disadvantaged group and refusing to deal with any possible redress that the
courts are capable of providing in the form of legal recourse. This refusal of the courts
to address the issue of legal recourse is at odds with the current Canadian
understanding of the concept of equality. In effect, the decisions of the courts achieved
nothing but rather, merely re-affirmed the Canadian government's position in 1994 as
announced by the Honourable Sheila Finestone, the then Secretary of State,
Multiculturalism and the Status of Women. 32 In fact, Sheila Finsteone's announcement
is not without flaws. It provided that "the issue is whether the best way to this [heal
the wounds] is to attempt to address the past or invest in the future. We believe our
only choice lies in using limited government resources to create a more equitable
society and a better future for generations to come." Arguably, economics seem to
play a determinative role for the Canadian government in deciding whether or not to
redress human rights infringements. The refusal of the Canadian government to
confront swiftly and to properly redress its past wrongs is embarrassing. Furthermore,
it would be dangerous for the government to send to the public the signal that blatantly
racist governmental actions in the past were excusable in the present time, because of
the prohibitive costs of remedying such. Such a message would inculcate in the minds
of the public the notion that the upholding of human rights and equality and the
righting of government racism is a relative concept dependent on the cost associated
with such measures. With great respect, this is simply not the acceptable standard
which Canadians should be taught to accept.
Reading the arguments of the Plaintiffs is educational for us because we learn that
European courts, in contrast to the Canadian courts, have refused to defer absolutely
to validly enacted law in those cases where such legislation is in reality unfair and at
odds with the core values of the law. In particular, we understand that the German

31.

Ibid. See also Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.I. 950, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36 (S.C.C.) (QL) at para.
93 (QL) where lacobucci, J stated that" ... s. 15(2) provides a basis for the firm recognition that the
equality right is to be understood in substantive rather than formalistic terms.... Having accepted the
substantive approach, the Court has interpreted s. 15(1) not only to prevent discrimination, but also to
play a role in promoting the amelioration of the condition of disadvantaged persons."
32. See supranote 18.
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courts have frequently confronted the import of National Socialist laws (the laws in
force during the former Nazi regime). Our government, on the other hand, is still
standing by its position taken in 1994. We often expect that if government officials or
politicians make mistakes or if they are caught in a mindset that is not conducive to
creating a freer and more democratic environment in Canada, the solution to this can
be simple: they will not be re-elected. As we know, however, the operation of the
judiciary is different. Judges are appointed, not elected, in this country; judges are the
custodians of rights and they are expected to apply the law so that justice is done and
is seen to be done. In the Mack case, the courts could not be said to have performed
these functions satisfactorily. It is not wrong for the courts to prefer the principle of
judicial deference to the legislature and apply it. This approach simply fails to take
into account the unique nature of the issues at hand. First, whenever equality or
Charterissues are dealt with, the law requires that such issues be determined with the
benefit of full factual records. This is missing in the Mack case as the OCA chose to
refuse, at the preliminary stage, to grant leave to the Plaintiffs to amend the claim to
incorporate fuller factual details in support of their arguments. Both courts dismissed
the Plaintiffs' case at the interlocutory stage on the grounds that the pleadings
disclosed no reasonable cause of action. This administration of justice in a cursory
style significantly undermines the seriousness of the issues. Furthermore, the OCA's
understatement of the importance of the current human rights movement and the
increasing recognition by the European courts of the need to redress past racism (and
incidentally the refusal of leave by the Supreme Court of Canada) has cast serious
doubts on just how willing our courts will be to uphold the contemporary conception
of justice, equality and respect for human dignity. The Canadian courts in the Mack
case, in effect, are telling the public that they have no interest in the current
developments with respect to human rights issues in the international community. This
was clearly the position of the OCA when it footnoted in its decision that "we are not
here concerned with facially valid laws enacted by a totalitarian or other despotic
regime. '33 This indifference is particularly alarming as it came from our Ontario
appellate court that is supposed to ensure that our law concerning state responsibility
for human rights evolves in a proper way so that Canada will continue to be a better
and safer place to live. Judicial indifference is also dangerous because it legitimizes
the continuing evasion, by the government, of the issues at stake here. As noted,
tackling racism starts with tackling the way the Canadian public thinks. It is arguable
that it may take a century for the general public to overcome fully an old way of
thinking or behaviour. Nevertheless, Canadians suffer, in this case, from the inertia of
being comfortable with the status quo, i.e., antiquated modes of thought. The risk
associated with such inertia is that our country will soon fall behind other nations in
the sphere of promoting human rights.
The Plaintiffs' materials filed in support of their application for leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada raised the issue of reasonable apprehension ofjudicial bias.
This issue merits discussion because it is important to the goal of improving the

33.

Supra note 29.

Case Comment

societal awareness of and sensitivity to the perceived prejudicial effects associated
with stereotypical thinking. The materials revealed certain troubling comments
allegedly made by the Honourable Justice James MacPherson, who co-wrote the
decision of the OCA, during the Plaintiffs' submissions regarding the argument of
unjust enrichment. Based on the Strug Affidiavit, 34 it was alleged that MacPherson
J.A. had made comments to the effect that head tax payers had suffered no more than
the average immigrant and less than many other groups, had received sufficient reward
for what they paid for by being allowed to remain in Canada, and were now generally
successful. 35 For example, it was alleged that MacPherson J.A. had stated that the
payment of the head tax would seem worthwhile to a Chinese immigrant when they
could see their grandchild play first string cello with the Toronto Symphony
Orchestra. 3 6 It should be noted that these allegations are not proven in a court of law
and there does not seem to have been any cross-examination of MacPherson J.A. under
oath on these matters. 37 Assuming, however, that these questions were in fact posed
by the presiding judge and were necessary in order for the OCA to further explore the
strength of the Plaintiffs' case, these questions are nonetheless flawed and, arguably,
reinforce the pre-existing, problematic thinking that Canada was home of the superior
Caucasian race and that other racial groups wishing to come and stay in this country
should be happy to be able to do so, regardless of the discrimination and other unjust
governmental treatments they might have received in the past. These thoughts are also
problematic because they trivialize and rationalize the significant damage caused by
the head tax and by other racist measures Canada imposed on Chinese people and,
possibly, other ethnic groups. In this regard, it should be noted that counsel for the
Plaintiffs forcefully argued that "MacPherson J.A.'s comments demonstrated an acute
insensitivity to the harm suffered by the Chinese Canadian community as a result of
the Act", 38 that "the legal system has often been complicit in the enforcement and
perpetuation of racist enactments" 39 and that "Canadian judges have not been immune
from the stereotypical thinking that gave rise to the Act and other discriminatory
measures. ' 4 0 It is unfortunate that in the current era, we still have to examine possible
racist undertones in a judge's comments, delivered during the course of a judicial
34. Jonathan Strug, the deponent of the Strug Affidavit, was co-counsel for the Plaintiffs in the Mack
case appearing at the OCA.
35. Exhibit A to the Strug Affidavit and Applicant Memorandum at paras. 29-31.
36. Ibid. at para. 31.
37. Ibid. at para. 32. Apparently, as a result of these comments, the Chinese Canadian National Council
made a complaint to the Canadian Judicial Council and counsel for the Plaintiffs wrote to the
Council, setting out an account of what had transpired during the hearing of the appeal of the Mack
case. MacPherson J.A. addressed the complaint in writing, responding that he did not recall the
precise wording of his comments, but recalled asking questions that related to some of the subjects set
out in the complaint. The Judicial Council dismissed the complaint without addressing the specific
allegations of the use of stereotypes, but referred to one of the comments by MacPherson, J.A. as
"unnecessay".
38. Ibid. at para. 31.
39. Ibid at para. 56.
40. Ibid. at para. 56.
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hearing. No doubt, we are still looking forward to the day when our judges can be
commended, without hesitation, for their unreserved and unequivocal appreciation of
the graveness of the harm of historic governmental racism and for their commitment
to eliminating the harmful effects thereof.
CONCLUSION
What have we learned from the courts' decisions in the Mack case? Simply put, the
Canadian courts' attitude with respect to correcting a government's past racism has
not yet evolved to a stage where they are willing to act in accordance with the current
movement, prevailing in European courts. In this regard, the Canadian courts have
preferred a traditional conservative approach of deferring the issue to the government.
The Canadian government apparently is still standing by the non-recourse position.
As a consequence of the two aforementioned factors, Canada has failed to give proper
redress to those payers of the head tax and their descendants.
By contrast, countries such as New Zealand are taking a far more progressive and
equitable approach to this matter. On February 12, 2002, the Prime Minister of New
Zealand issued a formal letter of apology to the Chinese New Zealand community in
which she committed the government to providing compensation to those who had
paid the poll tax to the New Zealand government. The Rt. Honourable Helen Clark
stated:
Today we also express our sorrow and regret that such practices were once
considered appropriate. While the governments which passed these laws acted in a
manner which was lawful at the time, their actions are seen by us today as
unacceptable. We believe this act of reconciliation is required to ensure that full
closure can be reached on this chapter in our nation's history. The Government's
apology today is the formal beginning to a process of reconciliation. The Minister of
Ethnic Affairs and I have been authorised to pursue with representatives of the
families of the early settlers a form of reconciliation which would be appropriate to
and of benefit to the Chinese community. To that end we wish to meet with key
representatives of the descendants to discuss the next step in this process of
reconciliation. The New Zealand Chinese Association, representing many of the
descendants of the Chinese who paid the poll tax, has suggested that it may be
appropriate for the government to make a contribution in the form of funds and
resources for the purpose of restoring and maintaining the Chinese heritage, culture
and language in New Zealand which was severely eroded as a result of the injustice
of the poll tax and other discriminatory policies. The government looks forward to
engaging further with the New Zealand Chinese Association and other descendants'
representatives to discuss such proposals,
There are certain facts that are irrefutable: racism is like a cancer that will only spread
and cause irreparable harm if detective and curative measures are not put in place in
time; in order to ensure that Canada continues to be a free and healthy place to live,
it is important for Canada to remedy historical wrongs resulting from racist policies
and laws, thereby creating a more just and therefore, a truly civilized society.

